Affect Theory as Pedagogy of the ‘Non-’ by Seigworth, Gregory J
109
14
Asignifying Semiotics: Or How to Paint Pink on Pink, Spring 2014, pp. 109-118
final footnote reads as follows: ‘Francois Laruelle 
proposes a comprehension of non-philosophy as 
the “real (of) science” beyond the object of knowl-
edge [in his book Philosophy and Non-Philosophy]. 
But we do not see why this real of science is not 
non-science as well.’1 End of footnote. End of book. 
What I hope to do here, then, is wander in and out 
of a few of the spaces, timings and orientations 
opened up by this invocation of the ‘non-’ and, then, 
through this wedge of illumination arising between 
Laruelle and Deleuze/Guattari, try to understand 
a little something about how affect intersects with 
disciplinarity: how every discipline intersects with 
its own singularising ‘non-’. Thus, to cut to the 
chase, I will argue that to fold affect into or out of 
any particular disciplinary accounting means, in the 
first and last instance (and all points in between), to 
raise pedagogic questions – about the instructively 
intuitive styles and manners by which any discipline 
configures and reconfigures its ongoing relationship 
with its ‘non-’.
 
For his part, and on behalf of his own claims to 
be doing ‘non-philosophy’, Francois Laruelle is not 
especially flattered by this final mention in What 
is Philosophy? nor by an earlier and seemingly 
complementary footnote from the chapter ‘The Plane 
of Immanence’, which reads: ‘Francois Laruelle is 
engaged in one of the most interesting undertakings 
of contemporary philosophy. He invokes a One-All 
that he qualifies as “nonphilosophical” and, oddly, 
as “scientific”, on which the “philosophical deci-
sion” takes root. This One-All seems to be close to 
I want to explore just the tiniest hinge of a little 
something. It’s a hinge that might open onto an 
adjacent universe, or maybe it hinges back to this 
universe as an immersive universe of a whole lot of 
something else altogether. That’s my hope at least. 
I could be wrong. It wouldn’t be the first time.
 This essay will take up theories of affect in rela-
tion to non-philosophy. An easy enough task for 
me, as I am – very distinctly – a ‘non’-philosopher 
by way of non-training (my educational background 
and employment are in communication and cultural 
studies; I teach in the Communication and Theatre 
Department at Millersville University, Pennsylvania). 
But I am a happy interloper into matters of philos-
ophy; I take what I want (ignore what I don’t want), 
I leave, I linger, I bump into things and they bump 
into me. We are a series of dents: philosophy and 
I (incidence/coincidence/accidents). Perhaps that 
is why I have always found something instructive 
about the entrance to the Philosophy Department 
at my university. [fig. 1] As you can see, the only 
way to enter philosophy in my corner of the universe 
is to simultaneously leave it. The entrance and exit 
to philosophy operate through the same door. I 
wouldn’t have it any other way. And neither will this 
essay.
 So, I wish to begin this argument (properly now) 
at the end, at an exit, at the last pages of the last 
chapter of the last book published by Felix Guattari 
and Gilles Deleuze: What is Philosophy? Indeed, I 
want to begin with that book’s very last footnote. This 
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thought and immanence – nothing to give or be 
given back. No cycle, no circle, no eternal return, 
no reversibility of desire and the concept… or, as 
he sarcastically remarks in section 1.5 of his ‘Anti-
Guattari’ poem:
We have loved these transcendental tautologies
Stretched out like a temple over our heads
Worlding world/nullifying Nothingness/speaking 
Speech/desiring Desire
Merry-go-round spun around by a Leibnizian 
ritournelle.6
Laruelle’s claim for his non-philosophy is, instead:
The Enjoyed suspended in its own immanence
What begins and completes itself with no circle
Begins there without departing from it
Completes itself there without return.7
In Laruelle, any single entity cul-de-sacs in the 
densest pitch-black of its own immanence (not at 
all the infinite gradations of light that Deleuze finds 
arrayed across the immanence of Spinoza’s three 
ethics). Or, as Graham Harman remarks, ‘it is not 
just the night but, even more so, the daylight, for 
Laruelle, in which all cows are black’.8 This under-
standing of immanence – as a mute, hermetic, and 
brute facticity of ‘the Real’ – is what initially earned 
Laruelle admittance into the non-correlationalist/
speculative realist school of thought of Quentin 
Meillassoux, Graham Harman and Ray Brassier, 
although Laruelle quickly exited at the very moment 
of his entry, apparently saying on his way out the 
door: ‘no, I have nothing to do with that – I just kind 
of got thrown into that Noah’s ark’.9
Laruelle defines his own One as the ‘One-in-One’, 
which he imagines not as the Spinozist ‘One-All’ (in 
its full, affectual, nonhuman potentiality) but in the 
absolute singularity and solitude of the ordinary or 
generic human.10 Laruelle’s immanence begins, 
that is, with the monadic-material singularity of the 
Spinoza.’2 Indeed, Laruelle voices his displeasure 
by publishing a lengthy ‘Response to Deleuze’, 
first published in France in 1995.3 However, with 
these briefest of coordinates (around immanence, 
science, and decision), perhaps we can begin to 
parse some of the key resonances and differences 
in the concepts and procedures that transpire 
between a Deleuzian-Guattarian philosophy and a 
Laruellean non-philosophy, and then use some of 
these markers to hint at controversies underfoot in 
the still-emerging disciplinisation(s) of affect.
 First, it can be easily noted (and regularly has 
been) that Laruelle and Deleuze are both self-
proclaimed philosophers of immanence. Yet 
Laruelle’s critique of Deleuze – and, yes, it is rela-
tively uncharitable (as we’ll soon see, Laruelle also 
has an elliptical and rather strange 1993 essay enti-
tled ‘Fragments of an Anti-Guattari’ written in the 
form of a poem) – is that Deleuze remains, in the 
end, too tied up with actually trying to philosophise 
immanence… as if immanence will simply yield to 
philosophical understanding, or somehow become 
the subject of ‘philosophical decision’, and is, thus, 
something to be readily and transparently shown. 
Hence, Deleuze and Guattari draw their ‘plane of 
immanence’ chapter toward its close by stating: 
‘Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not 
so much to think THE plane of immanence as to 
show that it is there, unthought in every plane, and 
to think it in this way as the outside and inside of 
thought, as the not-external and the not-internal 
inside – that which cannot be thought and yet must 
be thought […].’4 And they finish with one further 
flourish by rather (in)famously proclaiming Spinoza 
to be the ‘Christ of philosophers’, a philosopher 
of infinite-becoming who draws up and thinks ‘the 
“best” plane of immanence’.5
 This all drives Laruelle (more than) slightly mad. 
For him, there is no thinking the outside and/or the 
inside of the non-thinkable unthought in his version 
of immanence. There is no reciprocity between 
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and Deleuze/Guattari, despite their divergences, 
feel that the practice of philosophy requires any 
accounting of immanence? And even more for 
my purposes here, why does this matter at all to 
the study of affect in and across, other disciplines 
besides philosophy?
 The answer is, quite simply, that immanence both 
the matter/mattering of philosophy and the motor/
motoring of affect. For Laurelle, the matter-ing/
motor-ing of immanence provides an absolute still-
ness, a dense point of the tightest, most contracted 
infinity. For Deleuze and Guattari, the matter/motor 
of immanence turns an infinite process, an all-at-
once absolute expanse of survey without distance. 
Here I’d argue that one thing that Laruelle and 
Deleuze share, across the gulf of their respective 
conceptualisations of immanence, is immanence as 
(a) neutrality, as other than human, not anti-human 
but as an a-human-ness that nevertheless is, for 
us, only accessible in the oscillation of entry/exit 
of what-counts-as-human. And it is affect-in-imma-
nence that reverberates across/along the cusp of 
this very oscillation.
 That is, immanence is most difficult to grasp 
because it ushers forth as sheer un-mediated 
neutrality in its indifference to most standard 
categories of thought (to thought-representation, 
to dialectics, to signification, to intellectual cogni-
tion), indifferent to perceptual-consciousness and 
a repressed unconscious, indifferent to ‘authentic’ 
human feeling (whatever that is), indifferent to any 
correlation of subject/object or human/world. In its 
sheer un-boundedness for Deleuze/Guattari (or in 
its tightly wound density for Laruelle), immanence 
is the horizon of potential or dispersion, but without 
guarantees (beyond good and evil); its tending 
never belongs strictly to anyone or anything, except 
to the ontogenesis of belonging (understood at 
its most generic, perhaps better as simply ‘being 
with’). As lived (by humans and non-humans, or by 
particles and waves for that matter), immanence is 
Existent (‘the Real’) as something that must be 
engaged always as a cipher to the infinities of a 
world; whereas for Deleuze and Guattari, everything 
starts in the middle, in the ceaseless turbulence and 
motion of a worlding that stretches ethologically 
across bodies of any and every sort (part-, organ-
less and otherwise). Admittedly, it is hard for me not 
to hear in Laruelle’s version of immanence a sort of 
wilful acephalism; the naïve-ish denial of one’s head 
(even if it is an always, already nonthinking head), 
and the separation of any reciprocation in capaci-
ties to affect and be affected in the void of all but 
the matter of the living and non-living in their purest 
state of suspension.
 Fortunately, there are other ways to address 
immanence philosophically and non-philosophi-
cally, and, to give Laruelle a bit of credit, he does 
elucidate many of the real difficulties of imma-
nence in ways that Deleuze will sometimes gloss 
with a gesture or a glance. But then again, Deleuze 
does acknowledge that Spinoza’s immanence as a 
third knowledge (following affectio or the capacity 
to affect and be affected as first knowledge, and 
common notions or relations (affectus) as the 
second) is difficult to attain, telling his students at a 
seminar in March of 1981:
I would be very much in favor of a mutilated Spinozism. 
I find at the level of common notions [Spinoza’s second 
kind of knowledge] that it is perfect. It suits me. It’s 
great […] except for the very simple reason that then 
there is a condition of being a truncated Spinozism. To 
be a mutilated Spinozism one must really believe that 
there is no essence, that there are only relations. If I 
believe that there are only relations and no essence, 
then it is obvious that I have no need of the third type 
of knowledge […] you can be a truncated Spinozism 
only if you think that, finally, there is no being, there 
are only relations.11
So, yes, I suppose – right about now – the big 
question is: Why bother? Why do both Laruelle 
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suspended churnings of problematic affects; these 
are affects that she argues might seem indetermi-
nate but are ‘actually highly determined’ (or better, 
highly determinable). Ngai says:
[W]hat each moment of conspicuous inactivity 
produces is the inherently ambiguous affect of affec-
tive disorientation in general – what we think of as 
a state of feeling vaguely ‘unsettled’ or ‘confused,’ 
or, more precisely, a meta-feeling in which one feels 
confused about what one is feeling. This is ‘confusion’ 
in the affective sense of bewilderment, rather than the 
epistemological sense of indeterminacy. Despite its 
marginality to the philosophical canon of emotions, 
isn’t this feeling of confusion about what one is feeling 
an affective state in its own right? And [isn’t it] in fact 
a rather familiar feeling that often heralds the basic 
affect of ‘interest’ underwriting all acts of intellectual 
inquiry?15 
Later, Ngai adds that these relatively inconspicuous, 
low-level affects – as manifest in the stuplime’s 
combination of astonishment and boredom – ‘might 
be said to produce a secondary feeling that seems 
strangely neutral, unqualified, open […] [T]his final 
outcome of stuplimity – the echo or afterimage 
produced by it, as it were – makes possible a kind 
of resistance’.16 But perhaps it is exactly this ‘kind 
of resistance’ (secondary in feeling, though actually 
first as Guattari would maintain)  – over-saturated, 
exhausted, dispersed, slack, unqualified, open – as 
a ‘strangely neutral’ sphere that brings us some-
what nearer to an understanding of affect as plane 
of immanence.
 
It is as ‘strangely neutral’ that, from a slightly 
different angle, Maurice Blanchot once referred to 
the ‘eternullity’ of the everyday.17 Or in the vibrant 
voicing of Clarice Lispector, from her The Passion 
according to G.H., when she registers the very 
moment of her own stupliminous epiphany:
endured as extraordinariness: on this, I think that 
Deleuze/Guattari and Laruelle would agree.
 This, then, is where I’d argue that there is some-
thing especially instructive about those so-called 
low-level, seemingly inconsequential affects – what 
Felix Guattari called ‘problematic affects’ as 
compared to ‘sensory affects’, which are those 
affects that are immediately ‘there’ and present to 
the senses, ‘a feeling of being’, although still without 
necessarily ever being brought to the forefront of 
conscious awareness. Problematic affects arrive 
at an outside-experiential or epi-phenomenological 
threshold; or more exactly, problematic affects fall 
perpetually and palimpsestically below this threshold 
where, Guattari says, ‘affect’s spatio-temporal 
congruence dissolves and its elucidating proce-
dures threaten to fly off in all directions’.12 It is these 
problematic affects that are more fundamental; they 
are, Guattari emphasises, ‘at the basis of sensory 
affects and not vice versa’.13 Continually slipping 
above or below a phenomenological threshold one 
encounters the emptiness or impassivity of time: 
a time-that-no-longer-passes or, as Guattari says, 
‘pathic time’ is threatened.14 Hence, often in the 
realm of such problematic affects, a certain degree 
of stability, accommodation or resistance is sought 
through the creation of ritornellisations; i.e., pattern-
ings, refrains, recurring spatio-temporal envelopes, 
or rhythms. 
 In her Ugly Feelings, Sianne Ngai locates some-
thing similar in what she calls ‘the stuplime’. Her 
notion of stuplimity is a rewiring of the Kantian 
sublime. In this case, transcendence does not erupt 
as the verticality of an infinite magnitude tearing 
away from the tedious ground of the ordinary, but 
rather, the stuplime is manifest as a supremely 
stupefying lateral-isation of feeling in suspension, 
congealing into the stickiness of affectual agglutina-
tion; relying, in part, on the typical snowballing of 
resonances, swerves, and impingements. For Ngai, 
the stuplime would be but one modality among the 
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depiction of the translator’s task, where transla-
tion is ‘standing not in the center of the language 
forest, but on the outside facing the wooded ridge; 
it calls into it without entering, aiming at that single 
spot where the echo is able to give, in its own 
language, the reverberation of the work in the alien 
one’.21 Benjamin has a variety of carefully chosen 
critical targets in this essay and in its brief echoing 
scene, just three of which are of immediate conse-
quence here. One is Benjamin’s quick, but crucial 
slide, from the task of translation to the capacity for 
translatability immanent in any act of translation. 
Second is his critique of any overly romanticised 
vitalism that links life only to ‘organic corporeality’, 
or perhaps extends life only as far as what he says 
is the ‘feeble sceptor of the soul […] or the even less 
conclusive factors of animality, such as sensation’.22 
Finally, given Benjamin’s forest-y thought-image, 
there is the whole matter of translation’s produc-
tion of the echo. Benjamin argues that life must 
be apprehended as a continua of translations or 
transformations. He acknowledges that there are 
whole sets of ‘beyonds’: the beyond of language, of 
organic corporeality, the beyonds of sensation and 
soul… but each beyond is yet-too-narrow. Benjamin 
understood that there was a wider plane that might 
encompass them all while also leaving them intact 
and not dissolving them into non-affectual nodes. 
Note, too, that Benjamin depicts this process 
through an image that would seem to lend itself to 
more immediate alignment with the spatial exigen-
cies of non-human activity: it is translation itself 
that stands at the edge of the wooded ridge, not an 
actual (human) translator.
 
Trading the wooded ridge for an open field (where 
no echo can return), Roland Barthes says the 
neutral (although here he uses ‘neuter’) ‘opens up 
an infinite, shimmering field of nuances, of myths, 
that could allow the Neuter, fading within language, 
to be alive elsewhere. Which way? I would say, 
using a vague word: the way of the affect: discourse 
comes to the [Neutral] by means of the affect’.23 
I am trying to tell you how I came to the neutrality and 
inexpressivity of myself. I don’t know if I am under-
standing what I say, I feel – and I very much fear 
feeling, for feeling is merely one of the styles of being. 
Still, I shall go through the sultry torpor that swells with 
nothingness, and I shall have to understand neutrality 
through feeling. Neutrality, I am speaking of the vital 
element linking things.18 
Perhaps it now seems fair to ask: but is ‘the neutral’ 
truly equivalent to immanence? Well, strictly, no. 
The neutral is, more properly, the in-itself intensity 
of capacity, the eternal latency of capacity: whether 
this capacity is One-All (‘a plane’ for Deleuze) or 
One-in-One (‘generic humanity’ for Laurelle). Either 
way, immanence is, as Guattari says of affect, ‘not 
[some] massively elementary energy but the deter-
ritorialized matter of enunciation’ composed of 
the accretions of bare (often minimal) things, their 
relations and non-relations.19 As Clarice Lispector 
writes at one point: ‘The will to accretion is great 
[…] because bare things are so wearing.’20
 
Because ‘the neutral’ is drawn from the lived/living 
gradients of an empirical field – even if the neutral 
actually comes to carry these gradients of intensity 
further away, never to return as personological or 
somehow representational (that is, the neutral’s 
minimal participation in transcendence does not fold 
itself over to reduplicate the empirical) – its imma-
nence remains immanence-to-the-transcendent (a 
power of extraction, of affectedness, of corporeal 
sensation/sensitivity or vulnerability), a relative 
immanence but not quite immanent to immanence 
itself (not quite Laruelle’s radical or Deleuze’s abso-
lute immanence).
 
But this is a moment when I think ‘the neutral’ 
might give us insight into the role of disciplinarity 
in regard to affect, as well as a pedagogy of the 
‘non-’. The image that I cannot shake (some-
times arriving in a moment of theoretical, if not 
also pedagogical danger) is Walter Benjamin’s 
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felt-relationality toward other (what-had-previously-
seemed non-adjacent) disciplines. 
And yet… disciplines need to retain their ‘non-
s’. It is what keeps disciplines from resolving their 
vibrancies and loose threads and dangling lines 
of discourse in the most unproductive of ways: by 
turning into each other. ‘Resolve’ has many mean-
ings, one of which is ‘to become void’, but far 
better to head in the direction of other definitions 
of ‘resolve’, such as ‘to become separated into 
component parts’ or ‘to become convinced’. Barthes 
cautioned, back in 1978, that the Neutral brings with 
it ‘the temptation of the ultimate or of the “ur” para-
digm’.26 More recently, Isabelle Stengers has fretted 
similarly that, with the cosmopolitical, she has come 
too close to ‘transforming a type of practice of which 
we are particularly proud into a universal neutral 
key, valid for all’.27 The neutral (and particularly 
this immanent/affective neutral as ‘ur paradigm’, 
valid for the whole of the study of affect) will not do. 
Disciplines – architecture, philosophy, communica-
tion studies, etc. – need their ‘non-s’ and their ‘alive 
elsewheres’. 
 At the end of What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and 
Guattari speak about how the plane of immanence 
intersects with disciplinarity, of the interferences 
that jump from plane to plane between disciplines, 
of the interferences that lodge some fragment of 
one discipline in the plane of another, and, finally, 
of the interferences that slip any disciplinary-local-
isation to address a discipline from its ‘non-’ place. 
‘Even science has a relation with non-science that 
echoes its effects’, they wrote, implicitly directing 
these words toward Francois Laruelle.28 Pedagogy 
should set to work – continue Deleuze and Guattari 
in their work’s final paragraph  – in a discipline’s 
relationship to its ‘non-’. However, they stress that 
this ‘non-’ was not present at (nor responsible for) 
the birth of the discipline, nor will it serve as its 
termination point; instead, the ‘non-’ accompanies 
the discipline at every moment of its becoming or 
Opens up? Fading within? Comes to? Where (in 
what space, in what manner of space) do these lines 
ultimately resolve themselves? Not, apparently, by 
the coordinates of Barthes’ own equation, within the 
neutral, but in an ‘alive elsewhere’. However, what 
is perhaps just as intriguing in Barthes’ formulation 
here is its last bit: ‘discourse comes to [the Neutral] 
by means of the affect’. Might such a characterisa-
tion in the end help us to understand something 
of what happens when disciplines – as ‘systems 
of control in the production of discourse’24 – come 
sometimes, each in their own way, to face up to the 
impassive face of the Neutral (by way of affect), and 
how their lines of discourse – at least momentarily 
untied or slackened – ultimately come to resolve in 
an ‘alive elsewhere’, in immanence?
 
‘Disciplines’, Michel Foucault noted in his lecture 
entitled ‘The Discourse of Language’, ‘constitute a 
system of control in the production of discourse, fixing 
its limits through the action of an identity taking the 
form of a permanent reactivation of the rules.’25 And, 
in many ways, affect is no doubt not wholly unique 
in its inconspicuously conspicuous unsettling of 
different disciplinary practices and identities, since 
disciplines are, after all, not infrequently struck by 
a variety of vibrancies: ‘turns’, returns, and ‘fermen-
tations’, timely interruptions, nervous exhaustions, 
tactical interventions, reckless exhilarations. And 
yet … and yet, there does seem to be something 
singularly unsettling, something distinctly otherwise 
about the supple and immanent architectural-effec-
tuations of affect, so that when a discipline comes, 
by way of affect, to the Neutral (as an impassive 
delegation born of immanence’s own immanence), 
it produces – simultaneously at the level of disci-
plinary expression and at the level of disciplinary 
content – the curious (or not-so-curious?) effect of 
a certain, yes, hyperconsciousness toward disci-
plinary boundaries, modes of address, thresholds, 
organising pre-suppositions, research methods, 
writing practices and the like, as it also ushers in 
a differentially pathologised surface-surround of a 
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its development.29 Thus, I tend to hear the call of 
Laruelle’s ‘non-’ more as a neutral provocateur. But 
in the collective space of every discipline’s own 
translational echoes, in their resolve not to dissolve, 
and through the pathology of these singular bodies 
of knowledge, by way of affect, lies each discipline’s 
‘alive elsewhere’. An ‘alive elsewhere’ – where 
affect serves at once: its entrance and exit.
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